University Faculty as Managerial Employees - NLRB v. Yeshiva University by Gray, John Andrew
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 3 Spring 1980 Article 3
1980
University Faculty as Managerial Employees -
NLRB v. Yeshiva University
John Andrew Gray
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gray, John Andrew (1980) "University Faculty as Managerial Employees - NLRB v. Yeshiva University," University of Baltimore Law




NLRB v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
John Andrew Grayt
This article examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in
NLRB v. Yeshiva University, which precludes many private
college and university faculty from collective bargaining
pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act. The author
discusses the Court's characterization of faculty who make
curricular recommendations that are normally determinative
as managerial employees without collective bargaining
rights. He concludes that this decision requires faculty
members to choose between bargaining collectively and
maintaining their fully professional role in the operation of
the university.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Inflation, threats of entrenchment, and the prospect of collec-
tive bargaining legislation in several states have stimulated a new
surge of interest in collective bargaining by college and university
faculty."' Whatever the collective bargaining interests of college and
t A.B., 1959, St. Mary's Seminary and University; S.T.L., 1963, Gregorian
University, Rome, Italy; S.T.D., 1970, Catholic University of America; J.D.,
1980, University of Baltimore School of Law; Associate Academic Dean, Mercy
College, Detroit, Michigan 1977-78; Graduate Dean, Loyola College, Balti-
more, Maryland 1978; Interim Dean, School of Business and Management,
Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland; meiber of the Maryland Bar.
1. Report of Committee N on Representation of Economic and Professional
Interests: 1978-79, ACADEME, BULL. AAUP, October, 1979, at 410. The report of
the committee went on to relate:
At present it is estimated that one third of full-time faculty members
are organized formally for the purposes of collective bargaining.
As the economic crisis deepens, as the pool of high school graduates
decreases, and as public doubt about the worth of the baccalaureate
degree increases, faculty members can increasingly be expected to work
collectively for solutions to their common problems.
Id.
For more than sixty years, the American Association of University
Professors (A.A.U.P.), a national voluntary, non-profit association of faculty at
institutions of higher education, has worked for acceptance, by the national
academic community, of standards of academic freedom, tenure, and responsi-
ble professional practice. Today the Association is regarded by faculty as an
authoritative voice of the academic profession.
For a general overview of the history of collective bargaining in higher
education and the relevant federal and state laws and issues, see R. CARR & D.
VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS (1973); P. HOLLANDER,
LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR EDUCATORS 137-52 (1978); and W. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 95-107 (1978).
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university faculty, the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University2 effectively denied many college faculties the
statutory right under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 to
organize for purposes of collective bargaining and to compel their
employers to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. The Supreme Court held that
when full-time faculty members at a private, non-profit institution of
higher education develop and implement, through faculty recom-
mendations, the institution's policies, those faculty members are
Ctmanagerial employees"4 of the school and as such have no right to
bargain collectively under the provisions of the NLRA. This decision
represents a reversal of the position taken by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) since 1971 and is an invitation to endless
litigation unless Congress acts to resolve the substantive issue of
whether, or which, college faculties are protected by the NLRA.5
II. THE NLRB AND COLLEGES
In 1951, the NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction over a private,
non-profit college in the Columbia case.' The Board reversed its
position nineteen years later and asserted its jurisdiction over such
an institution in Cornell University.7 Cornell and Columbia both
involved the unionization of non-academic employees. In 1971, in
2. 100 S. Ct. 856 (1980). Justice Powell, writing for the court, was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Brennan
was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun in dissent.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
4. Managerial employees are "those who 'formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.'"
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace Laundry
Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
5. Since the Yeshiva decision on February 20, 1980, the university administration
at Villanova, which earlier had agreed to forego NLRB hearings and hold a
union-representative election, has changed its mind on the grounds that under
Yeshiva its faculty are not entitled to bargain collectively under the NLRA.
The University of New Haven has terminated contract negotiations with the
faculty union. See THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, March 17, 1980, at 2.
6. Columbia, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). In Columbia, the threshold question was
whether the NLRB should assert jurisdiction over non-profit, private colleges.
The Board decided that it would not "assert its jurisdiction over a non-profit,
educational institution where the activities involved are noncommercial in
nature and intimately connected with charitable and educational activities of
the institution." Id. at 427. The Board declined jurisdiction over clerical
employees of the Columbia University libraries.
7. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). See R. CARR & D. VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
COMES TO THE CAMPUS 25-26 (1973). The NLRB decided to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction over these employers in Cornell because of the
significant change in impact that institutions of higher education had on
interstate commerce since Columbia nineteen years earlier.
The Board set the jurisdictional standard for cases coming from private
institutions at an annual gross operating revenue of at least one million
dollars. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979).
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C.W. Post Center of Long Island University,8 the NLRB indicated in
dictum that college faculty were eligible under the NLRA for
inclusion in a collective bargaining unit.' This set the stage for the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decision in
NLRB v. Wentworth Institute,"° the initial judicial confirmation of
the NLRB's position that faculty at private institutions have the
right to organize under the NLRA for purposes of collective
bargaining."
The Wentworth court rejected the Institute's argument that its
full-time faculty were not employees covered under the NLRA.12 The
court reasoned that the faculty members would be excluded from the
Act's coverage if they were supervisors 3 or managerial employees.
Because the faculty were not members of either category,14 the court
ordered the Institute to bargain with the union. 5
The basis of the statutory exclusion of supervisory employees
from the collective bargaining unit lies in the threat of the
employees' divided loyalties. To allow supervisors to be included in a
collective bargaining unit or organized in a separate union would
create the danger of divided loyalties threatening the integrity of the
8. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
9. Id. at 905. "Mindful that we are to some extent entering into an unchartered
area, we are of the view that the policy-making and quasi-supervisory
authority which adheres to full-time faculty status but is exercised by them
only as a group does not make them supervisors ... or managerial employees
. . . . Id.
10. 515 F.2d 550 (lst Cir. 1975).
11. Wentworth affirmed the NLRB's position that a non-profit, private institution of
higher education is an "employer" under the NLRA. The First Circuit stated:
[We are unable to convince ourselves that all faculties of all private
non-profit institutions of higher learning in the nation are so situated
as to fall outside the ranks of "employees" under the Act. Given wide
differences in terms of service and responsibility, the focus must be
upon each particular institution.
NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 556 (1st Cir. 1975). The court
continued, however:
[We do not comment on the Board's developing views on the
significance of a substantial faculty role in decisions on curricula,
admissions, hiring, degree requirements and other educational policy
matters. . . . Neither do we suggest that faculty members with
different relationships and status than those herein are necessarily
included employees under the Act.
Id. at 557-58.
12. Id. at 556-58.
13. Section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), defines "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or
to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.
14. NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 556 (1st Cir. 1975).
15. Id. at 557-58.
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union, or that of management, or both. Presumably, a supervisor's
union membership influences, at least subtly, his recommendations
concerning product and market decisions because of the implications
of those decisions for his union colleagues. Conversely, the loyalty of
a supervisor to management could weaken the union's strength. 6
The courts have relied on a similar rationale to exclude managerial
employees from the collective bargaining process under the NLRA.'7
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF YESHIVA
The Yeshiva University Faculty Association petitioned the
NLRB in 1974, seeking certification as the bargaining agent for
most of the school's full-time faculty. 8 After five months of hearings
at which the University opposed the petition on the grounds that the
faculty were not "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA
because they were managerial or supervisory personnel, 9 the Board
granted the Association's petition and ordered elections.2" The NLRB
concluded that the faculty were neither managerial nor supervisory
employees, but professional employees explicitly covered under the
Act.2'
16. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 868-69 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See Beasley v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1974).
17. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 862 (1980). See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
18. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 858 (1980). Full-time faculty included
professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, department
chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty, and assistant deans. Part-time
faculty, lecturers, principal investigators, deans, acting deans, and directors
were excluded from the petition. Only 10 of the 13 schools at the University
were included in the Association's petition. Id. at 860 n.7.
19. Id. at 858. Managerial employees, defined at note 4 supra, and supervisory
personnel are not included in the NLRA's provisions granting employees the
right to bargain collectively. Supervisors are explicitly excluded by the Act. See
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). The courts have interpreted the Act to exclude
managerial personnel. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
20. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 860 (1980).
21. Id. Section 2(12) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976), defines "professional
employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual
and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual,
mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that
the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized
in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a
prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an
institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized
intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph
(a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a
professional person to qualify himself to become a professional
employee as defined in paragraph (a).
400 [Vol. 9
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After the Association won the union election, the University
refused to sit down at the negotiating table. 22 As a result of this
refusal, the union brought and prevailed in an unfair labor practice
proceeding. When the University again refused the Board's order to
bargain with the Association, the NLRB sought enforcement in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 3
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Second Circuit denied the Board's petition.2 4 Although the
Second Circuit agreed that the faculty at Yeshiva were professional
employees, the court ruled that the significant part the faculty
played in deciding the University's policies went beyond their role as
professional employees.25 By "pervasively operating" the institution,
the faculty had acquired the status of managerial employees. 6
Through its decision in Yeshiva, the Second Circuit dramatically
challenged the position taken by the NLRB since C.W. Post that
college faculty are protected under the NLRA. The court totally
rejected the rationale used by the NLRB to justify including faculty
of private institutions of higher education within the protective
coverage of the Act.27 According to the court, the NLRB had
summarily decided the issue without any analysis "simply by stating
that the substantial authority of the faculty was wielded in their
22. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 860 (1980).
23. Id. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 688.
25. Id. at 697-98.
26. Id. at 688.
27. The Second Circuit in Yeshiva considered Wentworth, but declared that decision
inapposite:
Although the Board has, on a number of occasions, considered the
question whether full-time faculty at a mature university are super-
visors or managers under the Act, no court of appeals has squarely
determined the issue. In NLRB v. Wentworth Institute . . . the First
Circuit simply rejected the Institute's argument that all faculty at all
institutions of higher learning must be excluded from the Act's
coverage. Limiting itself to the institution at hand, the court found that
at Wentworth there was "no evidence of an instance of significant
faculty impact collectively or individually on policy or managerial
matters."
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 695 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis in
original) (quoting NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 557 (1st Cir. 1975)).
The Second Circuit's construction of Wentworth was that it stands not for
the proposition that all faculties at all private, non-profit institutions of higher
education have rights under the NLRA, but that faculties that have no
substantial authority and no significant impact have rights under the NLRA.
Based on this construction, the Second Circuit concluded: "Given the great
diversity in governance structure and allocation of power at such universities,
it is appropriate to address ourselves solely to the situation at the institution
involved in this proceeding." 582 F.2d at 696.
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capacity as professionals and by invoking three doctrines pro-
mulgated in earilier board rulings."2
The NLRB first contended that full-time faculty are "profession-
al employees" as defined in section 2(12) of the NLRA.29 Accepting
this argument, the court asserted that, on the basis of the Board's
own prior decisions, "the fact that employees are professional does
not preclude them from also being categorized as supervisory or
managerial employees ineligible for inclusion in a bargaining
unit. '30 The court distinguished the individual professor's teaching
activities from the faculty's extensive control over curricular and
faculty status matters. Although a professor's authority to determine
course content, teaching methods, and student evaluation should not
be characterized as managerial or supervisory, the collective author-
ity of the professors at Yeshiva University was seen to extend far
beyond the classroom. Citing faculty control over course offerings,
teaching assignments, faculty course-loads, salaries, and tenure, as
well as student admissions, curriculum, tuition, and graduation
requirements, the court refused to equate the input of a full-time
university faculty which is responsible for the conduct and direction
of the university with that of professionals in a commercial
enterprise whose advice may occasionally influence management
decisions.31 "This is not the case of a company which hires an
occasional scholar to guide it in making engineering, legal, or
accounting decisions which have an impact on its business; this is
the 'company of scholars' itself. 32
The NLRB's second argument was that "since the faculty's
supervisory and managerial functions are exercised 'on a collective
basis' rather than by individual faculty members, they must be
denied status as supervisory or managerial personnel."33 The Second
Circuit rejected the NLRB's "collective exercise" argument for three
reasons. First, the Board had never adequately explained this
rationale to the court's satisfaction. 34 Second, the court rejected a
28. Id.
29. See note 21 supra.
30. 582 F.2d 686, 697 (2d Cir. 1978).
31. Id. at 698.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The collective exercise doctrine first appeared in C.W. Post Center of Long
Island Univ., 198 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971) and Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B.
134 (1971). In both cases the NLRB failed to support the "collective exercise"
doctrine with analysis, cited precedent, or legislative history. The Board
admitted, in Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), that they created the
doctrine in an attempt to apply the terms of the NLRA, which are designed for
the business world, to the administrative setting of a university. NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 698-99 n.i4 (2d Cir. 1978). -
The Second Circuit found no merit to the Board's contention that the
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literal construction of section 2(11) of the NLRA, which defines
supervisor, because such a construction would restrict application of
that section exclusively to an individual. 3 Moreover, the court saw
no need to resolve the issue of the construction of section 2(11) "since
there is no such 'individual' statutory restriction in the Board's own
concept of 'managerial employees.' "36
In addition, the NLRB contended that the faculty acts on their
own behalf and not in the interest of the employer. Rejecting this
argument as conclusory and unsupported either by facts in the
record or by the Board's reasoning, the court noted:
[T]he fact that the administration and Board of Trustees of
Yeshiva so rarely interfered in the faculty decisions indi-
cates that the interests of the faculty and of the University
were almost always co-extensive. . . . The full-time faculty
. . .have not in fact acted simply in an advisory capacity
[n]or have they merely made recommendations which were
accorded substantial weight; their decisions on major policy
issues have, for the most part, proved definitive.37
Taking a realistic assessment of the way in which a university such
as Yeshiva functions, the court concluded that the NLRB's "interest
of the faculty" analysis was inapplicable.'
The NLRB's next argument, that the faculty is not managerial
or supervisory because it is subject to the ultimate authority of the
faculty were not managers because they make recommendations as a group
rather than as individuals. The court noted that company boards of directors
also create policies as a group, rather than individually, even though the board
members are managerial. Id. at 699-700.
35. See note 13 supra for the NLRA definition of supervisor. Explaining that the
NLRA's legislative history indicates that the collective exercise of authority
was not actively considered by Congress, the court determined that a literal
reading of the Act was unrealistic "since group action is so frequently
encountered in modern corporate decision making." 582 F.2d 686, 699 (2d Cir.
1978).
36. Id. The court explained: "[I1n other holdings by the Board . . .the collective
exercise of authority was not grounds for exclusion from supervisory status." Id.
37. Id. at 700.
38. Id. The Second Circuit's own "realistic assessment" of the way a university
functions was based on Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of
Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63 (1973), in which
Kahn argues that "in higher education there is no sharp dividing line between
the employer and the employee" and that "the university is, ideally, a
professional community in which common educational interests supersede all
potential divisions between the faculty and the university." Id. at 68. The court
also relied on Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 52 A. A.U.
P. BuLL. 375 (1966) (jointly formulated and approved by the American
Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, and
the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges), which
asserted the principle of shared authority among the board of trustees, the
administration, and the faculty.
1980]
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Board of Trustees, was rejected as "particularly unconvincing." 9 The
court compared the University's Board of Trustees to a board of
directors of a corporation. Just as the corporation's managerial and
supervisory employees are under the direction of the corporate
board, so too might Yeshiva's faculty be managerial and supervisory
employees, even though they are under the direction of the
University's Board.40 Indeed, this is the very position occupied by the
clearly managerial president, vice-presidents, and deans at Yeshiva
University.41
Finally, the NLRB urged that its factual findings as to employee
status were entitled to great weight and should not lightly be set
aside. Although the court agreed with that principle, it found that
the Board's decision not to classify the Yeshiva faculty as manage-
rial or supervisory had neither factual basis nor persuasive
rationale. 42 The court therefore refused to affirm the Board's finding.
In support of its conclusion that Congress did not intend to grant
collective bargaining power to faculties of private universities, the
court referred to the NLRA's legislative history, noting that the
governance of university faculties "is unique and has no counterpart
in the commercial business models the Act was designed to
regulate. '43
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion
that Congress probably did not contemplate extending the NLRA to
university faculties," but asserted that "[t]he absence of explicit
congressional direction . . . does not preclude the Board from
reaching any particular type of employment. '45 Resolving the issue of
college faculty status under the NLRA, the Supreme Court held that,
even if the Yeshiva faculty were professional employees as defined in
the Act,46 they were also managerial employees. 47 As professionals
39. 582 F.2d 686, 701 (2d Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 701-02.
41. Id. at 701. The university president, vice-presidents, and deans were not
included in the full-time faculty seeking collective bargaining rights. Id. at 688
n.1.
42. Id. at 702.
43. Id. at 703.
44. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 861 (1980).
45. Id. (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124-31 (1944)).
46. See note 21 supra.
47. 100 S. Ct. 856, 864 (1980). See note 4 supra. Although the Second Circuit's
opinion included a lengthy discussion of the statutory category of supervisory
employee, the Supreme Court deliberately refrained from discussing and
applying that category. Both the majority and dissent restricted their analyses
to the faculty's role concerning curricular matters and did not analyze the
faculty's role concerning faculty status matters (i.e. recommendations regard-
ing the appointment, re-appointment, promotion, and tenure of faculty
404 [Vol. 9
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the faculty would have been included in the collective bargaining
procedures under the NLRA, but as managerial employees they were
excluded from that protection.
A. The Tension
Both the majority and the dissent acknowledged the tension
created by the NLRA's inclusion of professional employees and
exclusion of managerial employees. The Court had to determine in
whose favor this tension was to be resolved. The Court considered
the Board's contention that "the managerial exclusion cannot be
applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees
because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial
authority when they are merely performing routine job duties."
Nevertheless, the majority was able to apply the managerial
exclusion in a straightforward manner to the professional employees
on the Yeshiva University faculty.
The majority acknowledged that a full-time college faculty
member, as an individual instructor who teaches courses, evaluates
the academic performance of his students, and conducts research, is
a professional employee entitled to collective bargaining rights.49 But
when the individual professor leaves his classroom or his office and
meets with his colleagues at the program-, department-, college-, or
university-wide level to discuss and make curricular recommenda-
tions, he ceases to be a mere professional and becomes a member of a
colleagues). The Court seemed to distinguish these two roles, associating
curricular matters with the category of managerial employee and faculty status
matters with that of supervisory employee.
48. 100 S. Ct. 856, 863 (1980).
49. The Court, considering college faculty members generally, noted:
It is plain. . . that professors may not be excluded merely because they
determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own
students, and supervise their own research. There thus may be
institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are
entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty
members at Yeshiva and like universities who properly could be
included in a bargaining unit. It may be that a rational line could be
drawn between tenured and untenured faculty members, depending
upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But we express no
opinion on these questions, for it is clear that the unit approved by the
Board was far too broad.
Id. at 866 n.31.
Apparently, Wentworth Institute is an example of an institution of higher
education where full-time faculty are "merely professional" since they only
teach courses, evaluate students' academic performance, and conduct their own
individual research. See NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 556 (1st Cir.
1975). A line can be drawn between tenured and non-tenured faculty by
restricting one or the other of these two groups to "merely professional"
responsibilities, but no self-respecting faculty, especially those who support the
American Association of University Professors Standards and Guidelines,
would accept such a division within the faculty.
1980]
Baltimore Law Review
managerial group, no longer entitled to NLRA protection."0 The
majority resolved the tension between these two roles played by one
and the same individual faculty member in favor of exclusion from
NLRB coverage, even though the average full-time faculty member
spends at most twenty to forty percent of his time with his colleagues
on curricular matters.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, defined full-time faculty
at Yeshiva as managerial employees for two reasons: the nature of
the decisions the faculty make coupled with the extent of the
authority they exercise. The majority relied on an analogy to the
business world. To decide the curriculum is to decide the "academic
product" and to decide admission and retention standards is to decide
the "academic market."51 Product and market decisions are properly
management decisions and not rank-and-file labor decisions. Fur-
ther, when the faculty's recommendations regarding the academic
product and the academic market are normally determinative, then
those recommendations effectively take on the managerial attributes
of absolute policy decisions.52 Because the decisions are those that, in
a business setting, would be management decisions and because the
faculty's recommendations are normally determinative, the faculty
are managerial. 53
B. The Dissent
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion stressed the uniqueness of
the faculty's role in the governance structure of a university and the
difference between the academia and industry." Brennan conceded
that product and market decisions may be management functions in
a business context and that corporate employees who effectively
recommend such decisions should be excluded from NLRB coverage
as managerial employees. The dissent contended, however, that a
university faculty could not be compared to corporate employees
50. Faculty do not characterize, nor would they accept a characterization of, their
role in these terms. Most faculties would consider any restriction of their
activities to the "merely professional" as creative of a semi-professional status
in which they are not being allowed to exercise the full scope of their
professional responsibilities. Faculties probably read the Yeshiva decision as
saying that semi-professional faculties have a statutory right, but fully
professional faculties do not.
51. 100 S. Ct. 856, 866 (1980).
52. Noting the faculty's control over course offerings, scheduling, teaching
methods, grading policies, matriculation standards, and admission and gradua-
tion requirements, the Court asserted: "When one considers the function of a
university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these." Id.
53. Id. at 864.
54. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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because the hierarchical decision-making structure of the business
world differs so much from that of the university.55
Brennan rejected the majority's view that the managerial status
of an employee should be judged by the nature of the decisions he
makes. Instead, the employee's status should be judged by examin-
ing on whose behalf the employee makes the decision.56 Only if the
employee "is acting on behalf of management and is answerable to a
higher authority in the exercise of his responsibilities"" should the
employee be ruled managerial. Brennan found that the Yeshiva
faculty offered its recommendations "in order to serve its own
independent interests in creating the most effective environment for
learning, teaching, and scholarship.""s In Brennan's view, because
they were neither acting solely in their employer's interest nor
accountable to their employer for exercising their professional
judgment, the Yeshiva faculty were not managerial employees. 9
Brennan further argued that the exercise of independent
professional judgment does not create the danger of divided
loyalties.' Curricular recommendations are based on academic
standards, are an exercise of academic freedom, and are not binding
on the administration or the governing board.6' Because the faculty
act independently, seeking the best environment for teaching and
research, union membership would not influence their recommenda-
tions. In addition, these recommendations are made from the
faculty's professional viewpoint rather than the administration's
perspective, and the faculty are not accountable to the administra-
55. Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan described the dual authority
structure common to most universities. On one hand, the Board of Trustees
issues orders to the school administrators, who in turn command the faculty.
On the other hand, a parallel professional network acts to bring faculty
expertise into the decision-making process. These professionals relay their
suggestions to the school administrators, one rung up the formal ladder of
authority. Id.
56. Id. at 870-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Brennan rejected the majority's position that employees are managers if the
employer agrees with their recommendations most of the time. According to
Brennan,
[Tihe pertinent inquiries are who retains the ultimate decisionmaking
authority and in whose interest the suggestions are offered. A different
test could permit an employer to deny its employees the benefits of
collective bargaining on important issues of wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment merely by consulting with them on a host of
less significant matters and accepting their advice when it is consistent
with management's own objectives.
Id. at 872 n.11 (citing Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19
(1st Cir. 1977)).
60. 100 S. Ct. 856, 868-69 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See text accompanying
note 16 supra.
61. Id. at 870-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion for the worth of the recommendation.2 Therefore, Brennan saw
no danger that the faculty would weaken the union. Finding no
threat of divided loyalties, the dissent concluded that the faculty
should not be excluded from coverage under the NLRA.'
VI. EVALUATION OF THE DECISION
Given the present and reasonably foreseeable dismal economic
situation of full-time faculty at private institutions of higher
education, the need for the right to bargain collectively is, according
to the majority, an issue for congressional legislation and not for
judicial action.6 This is the classic and legitimate response of a
philosophy of judicial restraint. The irony is that the majority did
reach the substantive issue. Rather than remand the case to the
NLRB for a factual analysis adequately supporting a rational
decision, the Court substituted its own resolution of the tension by
including the Yeshiva faculty within the provisions of the NLRA as
professionals, but excluding them from collective bargaining rights
because they are managerial employees.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Yeshiva characterized
the role of university faculty differently. The majority viewed the
faculty member as simultaneously both a professional and a
managerial employee.6 5 As a professional, the faculty member uses
his special skills and training to teach his students and conduct
research. As a managerial employee, that same person is a
contributing member of the group that effectively recommends or
decides academic product and academic market, the policies most
central to any academic enterprise. The subject matter of their
collective decisions is managerial and their recommendations are
normally decisive. The majority therefore viewed the faculty as
62. Id.
63. Id. Brennan noted that:
The premise of a finding of managerial status is a determination
that the excluded employee is acting on behalf of management and is
answerable to a higher authority in the exercise of his responsibilities.
The Board has consistently implemented this requirement - both for
professional and non-professional employees - by conferring manage-
rial status only upon those employees "whose interests are closely
aligned with management as true representatives of management."
(Emphasis added.) E.g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento,
227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385
(1975); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974). Only if
the employee is expected to conform to management policies and is
judged by his effectiveness in executing those policies does the danger of
divided loyalties exist.
Id. (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 866 n.29.
65. Id. at 864.
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being in control of curricular policies with rare dissent from the
administration.
The dissent considered the majority's characterization of uni-
versity faculty "an idealized model . . . a vestige of the great
medieval university."66 According to Brennan, the majority's under-
standing of the realities of the faculty role was "distorted by the
rose-colored lens through which it views the governance structures
of the modern-day university. '67 Brennan especially disputed the
majority's conclusion that faculty recommendations are usually
determinative. He described an increasingly impotent faculty trying
to organize to insure that academic ideals are actually practiced,
while administrators rarely consider themselves bound by faculty
recommendations and make decisions based on fiscal and manage-
ment policies." From these contrasting charicatures evolved the
differing opinions as to whether the faculty at Yeshiva University
should be covered by the NLRA.
Yeshiva stands for the proposition that, when the faculty
controls curricular matters, it has no statutory right to bargain
collectively. After all, it is in command and can insure that the
ideals of the academic community are actually practiced. Conversely,
when the full-time faculty simply teach their courses, evaluate their
students, conduct their own research, and do not control curricular
matters, they have a statutory right to bargain collectively. For
then, even while exercising independent professional judgment, they
are rank-and-file professionals "whose decision-making is limited to
the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they
have been assigned."69 In essence, the majority sees full professional-
ization as a bar to the statutory right to collective bargaining.
A particularly troubling aspect of the majority opinion is that it
fails to consider that the average faculty member probably spends
far less than twenty percent of his or her time as a managerial
employee. The majority resolves the tension between eighty percent
of the faculty's time as professional employees and twenty percent of
the faculty's time as managerial employees in favor of exclusion
from coverage under the NLRA, and does so without giving a reason
for this resolution. According to Yeshiva, even if only a minor part of
the faculty's responsibilities are managerial, the faculty has no
statutory bargaining right under the NLRA.
The stance of judicial restraint requires the recognition that
Congress' basic intent in creating the NLRB was for that agency to
exercise its discretionary judgment and for that judgment to be
66. Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 866.
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accepted by reviewing courts when it is rationally based upon factual
findings and analysis. The Supreme Court not only refused to accept
the NLRB's decision that the Yeshiva faculty had a right to bargain
collectively, but also informed the Board that when facing a similar
situation in future cases, the Board must examine whether the
decision-making process in question is properly a management
function and whether the recommendations made are normally
determinative. College faculty who make such recommendations are
to be considered managerial and outside the protection of the NLRA.
This is so even when the individual professor makes his recom-
mendations in his independent role as a fully professional member of
the college faculty, unaligned with his employer, the college
administration.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Yeshiva, being fully professional precludes the university
faculty from collective bargaining. Yeshiva stands for the proposition
that Congress intended collective bargaining only for semi-
professional faculty members. This decision creates a cruel dilemma
for faculty at many American colleges and universities. Unless
Congress explicitly expands the NLRA to include college faculty,70
faculty members must choose between being semi-professional with
a statutory collective bargaining right or being fully professional
without that right. They must choose either to continue their
historic insistance on full faculty professionalism or to be members
of a labor organization for semi-professional faculties.
70. In direct response to the Yeshiva decision, Representative Frank Thompson of
New Jersey introduced in Congress a bill which would amend the definition of
supervisory personnel in section 2(11) of the NLRA to prevent college faculty
members from being deemed supervisors or managers solely on the basis of the
faculty's participation in decisions regarding courses, curriculum, personnel, or
other matters of educational policy. See H.R. 7619, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The bill is pending before the Labor Management Subcommittee. No action is
expected before the next legislative session.
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